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NO. 27 JUNE 2019 Introduction 
Beyond Obama’s Red Lines: The Syrian 
Arab Army and Chemical Warfare 
Can Kasapoğlu 
The Syrian Arab Army’s chemical warfare capacity has been a game-changer through-
out the civil war. Unlike intelligence estimates, Bashar al-Assad’s military planners 
considered these deadly weapons to be tactical arms for battlefield use, rather than 
last-resort strategic assets. During the reconstruction period, the West should pur-
sue a comprehensive approach to address issues concerning Syria’s weapons of mass 
destruction. 
 
Recent studies have specified 336 chemical 
strikes in Syria to date over the course of 
the civil war. Estimates suggest that Assad’s 
forces are responsible for 98 percent of 
these attacks. Notably, around 90 percent 
of the use of chemical weapons (CW) took 
place after the “red lines” were drawn by 
Barack Obama’s administration back in 
2012. 
Prior to the civil war, experts had little 
information about the Syrian Arab Army’s 
(SAA) chemical warfare doctrine. Intelli-
gence reports from the Cold War era showed 
that only a small number of well-trusted 
personnel in the infamous strategic weap-
ons proliferation hub CERS (Centre d’Etudes 
et de Recherches Scientifiques) took part 
in the Baath regime’s shady efforts. Late 
President Hafez al-Assad exercised full 
control over the CW arsenal. Declassified 
CIA assessments predicted that the Scud 
ballistic missile variants were the primary 
delivery means. 
Of the three characteristics of Syria’s CW 
program – the president’s centralized grip 
on the arsenal, the involvement of a limited 
number of personnel, and the principality of 
ballistic missiles as a means of delivery – 
only the latter has seemed to change 
throughout the civil war. Open-source in-
telligence suggests that the regime has pri-
marily used barrel bombs in CW delivery 
for certain reasons. Chlorine – a commer-
cially use chemical – was not included in 
the disarmament deal. It blurred the red 
lines and, unlike nerve agents, has not 
generated harsh international response. 
Thanks to help from Russia and Iran, the 
regime has managed to keep its rotary-wing 
platforms operational, despite heavy attri-
tion. Besides, barrel bombs require few, if 
any, technical skills in order to be dropped 
from choppers. In brief, although the 
Syrian military has suffered from consider-
able manpower losses, it has managed to 
keep its helicopters flying and its chlorine/ 
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barrel bomb production lines active. Never-
theless, in some critical cases, such as 
Ghouta, Saraqeb, and Khan Sheikhun, non-
persistent nerve agents were the CW of 
choice to deliver devastating results. Notably, 
having analyzed environmental samples 
collected from the impact points following 
the April 2017 Khan Sheikhun attacks, 
French intelligence not only found the un-
deniable presence of sarin, but also hexam-
ine, which is the signature stabilizer sub-
stance of the Syrian CW program used in 
the synthesis of sarin. 
The Dark Art of Chemical Warfare 
Chemical warfare aims at compensating for 
conventional shortfalls. A belligerent could 
deploy these dreadful weapons within a 
number of concepts of operations (CONOPS), 
such as leading an offensive blitz by deliv-
ering rapid shock-and-awe impact, displac-
ing civilians or depopulating a settlement, 
or denying an area to the adversary. Chemi-
cal weapons are effective psychological 
warfare assets, too. 
From a military standpoint, operational 
and tactical objectives determine the agent 
of choice. Persistency is a key parameter in 
this respect. For example, at 25°C, 1 cubic 
meter of air can hold approximately 22,000 
mg of Sarin (a very deadly, non-persistent 
nerve agent), some 900 mg of sulfur mus-
tard (a persistent blister agent), and 10 mg 
of VX (venomous agent X – a very per-
sistent and very lethal nerve agent). Other 
critical factors are lethality and the rate of 
action. Environmental factors such as wind, 
temperature, and topography also affect the 
outcomes. 
Whereas offensive planning would opt 
for the deployment of non-persistent agents 
with high rate of action, defensive planning 
would focus on persistent agents for deny-
ing terrain, disrupting enemy lines of com-
munication, and slowing the adversary’s 
operational tempo. Sarin variants, for ex-
ample, would make ideal agents for staging 
aggressive assaults thanks to their strong 
neurotoxic effects, easy respiratory absorp-
tion when dispersed as aerosol, as well as 
their low persistency, which causes short-
term, primary contamination, thereby 
allowing incursions by follow-on forces. 
The very persistent nerve agent VX and 
the persistent blister agent sulfur mustard 
would be more suitable for contaminating 
an area for a long period of time and deny-
ing it to the enemy. The latter has a rela-
tively slow rate of action compared to nerve 
agents. It would take hours to observe blis-
tering and edematous effects after exposure 
to sulfur mustard. However, since mustard 
lesions need months of medical care, the 
agent could significantly stress an adver-
sary’s operations by overstretching its mili-
tary medicine capabilities. Alternatively, 
if the belligerent wants to keep a relatively 
low profile, it could use incapacitating 
choking agent derivatives of chlorine, as 
widely observed in Syria. 
Thinking Like an SAA General 
The military rationale behind the Baath 
regime’s CW use roots back to a major 
degradation of the SAA’s manpower at the 
outset of the conflict. Although the regime 
sent detachments from its elite units (such 
as the Republican Guard) to bulky conven-
tional formations for keeping the disci-
pline, the army lost nearly half of its per-
sonnel. Whereas the SAA had some 325,000 
troops in 2011, the number fell below 
180,000 in 2013. This was a major blow. 
Even before the civil war, Syria had a 
very corrupted conscription and mobiliza-
tion system that adversely affected regular 
units when the unrest broke out. The 
regime’s efforts to call up the reservists 
(male Syrians in their 20s and 30s who com-
pleted their conscription service) backfired 
and triggered even more desertions. 
However, interestingly, we have not wit-
nessed a total collapse of the SAA. To grasp 
the unexpected resiliency of the Syrian 
military, one should have a closer look 
at the political-military legacy of Hafez 
al-Assad, and how Bashar capitalized on it. 
The Syrian defense apparatus has long 
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manifested the pronounced sectarian char-
acteristics of the regime. The SAA’s elite 
units (such as the 4th Armored Division, 
Air Force Intelligence, and the Republican 
Guard), which benefit from favoritism, are 
predominantly manned by the Alawites, a 
sect from which the ruling clans of Syria – 
most notably the Assads and the Makhloufs 
– hail. Hafez al-Assad had maintained the 
Alawite officer corps’ loyalty through a com-
plex socio-economic structure. Damascus’ 
social fabric was redesigned by Hafez 
al-Assad based on regime security needs. 
The military housing system remains the 
most visible example in this respect. Hafez 
al-Assad initiated large-scale inhabitation 
projects for the Alawite-dominated “warrior 
class” and families in Damascus. Likewise, 
the praetorian units’ headquarters were 
built along the gateways of the capital, 
ready to repel any attempt to overthrow the 
Baathist dictatorship. Sectarian policies for 
manning key military and security posts 
have linked nearly every Alawite tribe to 
the Syrian state apparatus in one way or 
another. This lucrative benefits system and 
social ascent of the Alawite community 
came at a price. The Assad clan has built 
a broad surveillance capacity resembling 
Moscow’s firm oversight on the Red Army. 
The SAA’s elite manpower has always been 
under strict scrutiny. Together, the above-
mentioned factors have kept the regime’s 
core warfighting capacity relatively intact, 
at the expense of attrition in large conven-
tional formations due to Sunni desertions. 
Inevitably, Assad’s military planners have 
adopted a “selective deployment” strategy, 
focusing on the key geopolitical axis across 
Damascus and Aleppo, and the Mediter-
ranean coast. This military geostrategic 
approach was tantamount to defending 
around 20 percent of the country’s territory 
with some 30,000 battle-hardened troops 
fighting alongside local pro-regime militia. 
In doing so, the SAA’s generals considered 
the CW arsenal to be a tactical game-
changer. Tellingly, the majority of chemi-
cal attacks took place along the Aleppo–
Damascus axis, particularly in key choke 
points for depopulating opposition-held 
areas, punishing the local populace, com-
pensating for the lack of manpower, and 
terrorizing opponents. 
Beyond the Red Lines 
The history of intelligence analysis un-
cloaks many failures. The Japanese strike 
on Pearl Harbor, the Arab Spring, the Tet 
Offensive, the 1979 Iranian Revolution, and 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks would be the top 
mentions. Does the Syrian case mark yet 
another intelligence failure? Well, at the 
outset of the civil war, the Western stra-
tegic community fell short of anticipating 
the real meaning of CW for the Baath 
regime. Unlike most predictions, Assad’s 
military planners have not considered their 
CW capacity to be a strategic asset of last 
resort, but a tactical means to compensate 
for conventional shortcomings. The Obama 
administration believed that drawing red 
lines – albeit without credible military co-
ercion backing them – would deter Damas-
cus and prevent chemical strikes. However, 
the regime was well aware of the fact that 
a Soviet Russia-style transition – in which 
the old security elite could keep their oli-
garchic positions in the new status quo – 
was not relevant for Syria at all. Any form 
of regime change would not only claim the 
positions of Syria’s ruling clans, but prob-
ably the lives of Assad and his nomenklatura. 
Thus, the Syrian war machine was tasked to 
quell the uprising with all means necessary, 
including chemical warfare. Finally, the 
transparency of the regime’s CW declara-
tions to the Organisation for the Prohibition 
of Chemical Weapons was very problematic. 
All in all, the regime has carried on with 
chemical warfare well after the disarma-
ment deal. 
Maybe in an effort to undo the legacy of 
George W. Bush concerning the Iraq weap-
ons of mass destruction case, the Obama ad-
ministration and its followers badly needed 
la belle époque of disarmament and nonprolif-
eration through diplomacy. In fact, as open-
source intelligence writings suggest, the 
Syrian Baath regime’s failure to report any 
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VX in known operational sites should have 
served as a warning in the beginning. The 
impracticality of carrying out a chemical 
disarmament mission amidst a civil war 
being fiercely fought was another under-
estimated drawback. 
Regarding CW, Syria was never totally 
disarmed, nor was Assad deterred by the 
“red lines.” Inevitably, the United States, 
the United Kingdom, and France had to con-
duct punitive military strikes. At the time 
of writing, the threat of CW was high in 
Idlib. Some sources have already reported 
chlorine use by the regime. 
What the West Can Do? 
Eliciting and attributing the use of CW in 
Syria go well beyond dealing with Middle 
Eastern affairs. A North Korean general 
in his well-decorated uniform revisiting 
preparations for military action along the 
demilitarized zone needs to know that he 
cannot get away with having any record 
of engaging in chemical warfare, given the 
fate of his Syrian counterparts. Failing to 
set a credible precedent in Syria could lead 
to an irreparable erosion in precious and 
hard-earned international norms. The 
West should use its political and economic 
leverage and pinpoint sanctions to weed 
out “chemical ringleaders” and perpetrators 
of crimes against humanity. In 2018, Ger-
man authorities, for example, issued 
an arrest warrant against General Jamil 
Hassan, one of the strongest military figures 
in the Baath regime. As head of the Syrian 
Arab Air Force Intelligence Directorate, 
General Hassan commands the most critical 
security branch of the regime. Moreover, 
he came to prominence as the one and only 
Syrian general who shattered a taboo by 
criticizing Bashar al-Assad in a Sputnik 
Arabic interview. If Germany’s efforts can 
prove that General Hassan is not untouch-
able, no other Syrian war criminal figure 
will be able to dream of a safe retirement. 
Secondly, the Western policy community 
should map the regime’s chemical warfare 
kill chain and publicly disclose the respon-
sible personnel. Russia, which won the war 
at large but still badly needs a consensus 
for reconstructing Syria, has to understand 
that no war criminal general of the SAA can 
be pardoned or rehabilitated. Nor can they 
have a place in the country’s defense appa-
ratus in the future. In the absence of a 
viable and just security sector reform, no 
reconstruction fund should be initiated – 
apart from the humanitarian aid for the 
people of Syria through the United Nations 
and non-governmental agencies. 
Thirdly, cutting the Baath regime’s mili-
tary ties with North Korea is essential to 
prevent the regime from fully restoring its 
offensive strategic weapons capacity. Pre-
venting illegal shipments and the transfer 
of know-how remain critical. 
Finally, the weapons of mass destruc-
tion programs of rogue nations generally 
depend on a narrow group of scientists and 
security elite. Putting Syria’s CW circles 
under strict control should be a top priority 
for Western intelligence services – before, 
during, and after the reconstruction period. 
Dr Can Kasapoğlu was the 2018 IPC-Stiftung Mercator Fellow at SWP.  
The Mercator IPC Fellowship Programme at SWP is funded by Stiftung Mercator. 
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